1
Evolution Toward Neutrality:
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ABSTRACT
This Article deals with the controversy surrounding the teaching of evolutionary theory in
American public schools, with a specific focus on disclaimers read by teachers before they teach
evolution. With the rise of religious fundamentalism and the correspondent change in the
American socio-legal climate, questions of religion and interpretation of the Religion Clauses of
the U.S. Constitution have become increasingly pertinent. In particular, the precise relationship
between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses is of special importance with religious
groups now more vocal in their articulation of their free exercise rights.
The current form of disclaimer either mentions specific religious theories about origins as
alternatives to evolution, or denigrates evolutionary theory in more indirect ways. Because such
disclaimers are clearly antithetical to the neutrality concerns of the Establishment Clause, they
have been held unconstitutional by all courts to date, including the December 2005 Kitzmiller
case in Dover, Pennsylvania. However, this Article suggests that striking down the disclaimers
without providing alternative responses to the legitimate free exercise concerns involved may
violate the Free Exercise Clause. As a way of negotiating free exercise and establishment
concerns, this Article proposes a generalized disclaimer: one that does not single out
evolutionary theory for special treatment, but rather addresses scientific inquiry as a whole.
Generalized disclaimers neither discriminate among religion, or between religion and nonreligion, or between scientific theories. This Article will then go on to discuss whether such
generalized disclaimers can ever be constitutional, despite their origins in the evolution
controversy. That is, are they poisoned by their roots, or can they be purged of this poison if
they become sufficiently neutral in form? This Article will conclude that the formally neutral
generalized disclaimers should be upheld on constitutional grounds.
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INTRODUCTION
The battle between creationism and evolution in American public schools has long
captivated the American public. Ever since the evolution controversy in the Scopes Trial of
1927,1 a few states have struggled to come up with a resolution as state school boards deal with
numerous proposals on ways to eliminate or counter the teaching of evolution. These proposals
have included such diverse measures as: (1) making creationism the sole basis of the curriculum;
(2) giving “equal time” to creationism and evolution; (3) offering intelligent design theory as an
alternative to evolution;2 and (4) reading or printing disclaimers along with materials on
evolution.3

This last measure is among the latest in the long history of the teaching of

evolutionary theory in public schools. Evolution disclaimers are either read out loud before the
teacher commences the lesson on evolutionary theory, or are printed on stickers that are pasted
inside biology textbooks. Regardless of form, the substance of the enacted disclaimers is the
same—disclaimers note weaknesses in evolutionary theory4 and in some cases mention
alternative theories of creation. Although the Fifth Circuit has struck down on establishment
grounds a disclaimer mentioning only the Biblical version of creation as an alternative to the
evolutionary theory of origins, no court has ever held that facially neutral disclaimers (i.e.,
disclaimers that have no reference to any religious theory) are problematic on the basis of the

1

154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist., No. 04cv2688, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 33647 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
3
See Judith A. Villarreal, God and Darwin in the Classroom: The Creation/Evolution Controversy, 64 CHI. KENT.
L. REV. 335, 345 (1988).
4
See F. Arthur Jones, A Creative Solution?: Assessing the Constitutionality of a New Creation/Evolution
Disclaimer, 49 LOY. L. REV. 519, 532 (2003) (describing the Alabama evolution disclaimer, which discusses the
factual weaknesses of evolutionary theory).
2
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Establishment Clause.5 This Article will discuss whether such facially neutral disclaimers,
despite their origins in the evolution controversy, can ever be constitutionally permissible.
The analytical starting point is acknowledging that establishment analysis is tempered by
the free exercise concerns implicated in any given case. This Article will examine the
jurisprudence and demonstrate how the Court defines the prongs of the various establishment
tests differently according to the type of free exercise issues presented. As a way of organizing
the complexity of this approach, this Article proposes dividing cases into categories, with each
category including cases that have similar facts and present similar sorts of free exerciseestablishment concerns. (This organizational method will be referred to as the “categorical
approach.”)
This Article explores the unique free exercise-establishment issues involved in the issue
of disclaimers on evolution teaching by proposing a generalized disclaimer: one that does not
single out evolutionary theory for special treatment, but rather addresses scientific inquiry as a
whole. Generalized disclaimers neither discriminate among religion, or between religion and
non-religion, or between scientific theories. Their non-discriminatory content is in conformity
with the requirements of the Establishment Clause, and their purpose is to respond to the
legitimate free exercise concerns of those parents opposed to the teaching of evolution. This
Article suggests that generalized disclaimers be classified in the same category as other
government measures that arise from a constitutionally problematic history, but have been
subsequently modified from their previously unconstitutional forms. This Article will then go on
to define this category, which it will refer to as the “untainted fruits of the poisonous tree”
5

See Winston R. Kitchingham, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: The Fifth Circuit Leaves William
Jennings Bryan on an Establishment Clause Cross, 75 TUL. L. REV. 533, 546 (2000) (because courts have not
addressed “the broader question of evolution disclaimers ... it is unclear exactly what elements would comprise an
acceptable disclaimer”). In this Article, the phrase will be used to refer to an approach that deals with government
measures rooted in a history of establishment violations.
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(hereafter “untainted fruits”).6 This Article will propose that the constitutional determination
within this category is whether the modified version is in fact an “untainted fruit” rather than an
inadequately modified (that is, “tainted”) fruit of the poisonous tree.
Part I evaluates proposed and enacted evolution disclaimers and the cases in which those
disclaimers have been challenged. Part II provides an overview of the various establishment tests
and their role in a relatively confused jurisprudence. Part III evaluates the constitutionality of
currently enacted disclaimers. Part IV discusses the free exercise-establishment tension
implicated in the case of disclaimers on evolution teaching. Part IV first proposes the generalized
disclaimer as a solution to this tension. This Part then goes on to use this hypothetical
generalized disclaimer to explore the contours of the jurisprudential analysis of “untainted
fruits.”

I. EVOLUTION DISCLAIMERS
A. Proposed and Enacted Disclaimers
Currently, Alabama and Georgia are the only states whose school boards have instituted
evolution disclaimers in their public schools. In 1996 when Alabama first began inserting
evolution disclaimers in students’ biology textbooks,7 the state’s decision stirred much debate.8
However, in November 2001 the Alabama Board of Education enacted a new disclaimer which

6

The term is taken from the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in criminal procedure. This doctrine serves as an
exclusionary rule, excluding from trial all evidence that derives from a violation of the defendant’s constitutional
rights. Mark S. Bransdorfer, Note, Miranda Right-to-Counsel Violations and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Doctrine, 62 IND. L.J. 1061 (1987).
7
CNN.com Education, Alabama Keeps Evolution Warning on Books (visited Oct. 15, 2004) <http://archives.
cnn.com/2001/fyi/teachers.ednews/11/09/evolution.ap/> (The “sticker contained questions students should ask about
evolution, such as: ‘Why do major groups of plants and animals have no transitional forms in the fossil record?’”).
8
Id.
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faced no dissent9 and was strongly supported by the Christian Coalition and the Eagle Forum.10
It reads in part:

A MESSAGE FROM THE ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION [to be
pasted in all biology textbooks]: This textbook discusses evolution, a controversial theory
some scientists present as a scientific explanation for the origin of living things, such as
plants, animals and humans. No one was present when life first appeared on earth.
Therefore, any statement about life's origins should be considered as theory, not fact. The
word "evolution" may refer to many types of change. Evolution describes changes that
occur within a species. (White moths, for example, may "evolve" into gray moths.) This
process is microevolution, which can be observed and described as fact. Evolution may
also refer to the change of one living thing to another, such as reptiles into birds. This
process, called macroevolution, has never been observed and should be considered a
theory. Evolution also refers to the unproven belief that random, undirected forces
produced a world of living things.11
It is important to note that this disclaimer, like many others, describes evolution as a
theory about the “origin of living things.” To describe it as such reflects a fundamental scientific
misunderstanding built into the disclaimer specifically and the evolution/creationism battle
generally, because evolutionary theory is neither a theory of creation nor a theory about the
origins of life. There are in fact two areas of science that are at odds with creationism:
cosmology, which for example describes how there came to be certain molecules and not others,
and evolution, a theory about life on earth. Specifically, evolution addresses how the
differentiations of kinds of things from algae to people arose. In between cosmology and
evolution, there is much speculation about the origins of life, although there is no real scientific

9

Id.
Id. (“The decision was actively supported by the Christian Coalition and the Eagle Forum, groups that seek more
religious activity in public schools.”). The Eagle Forum’s mission statement:
We support the Declaration of Independence and its fundamental doctrine that we owe our existence to the
Creator who has endowed each of us with inalienable rights. We support the U.S. Constitution as the
instrument of securing those God-given rights. We acknowledge the Holy Scriptures as the source of the
best code of moral conduct.
Alabama Eagle Forum, Our Mission (visited Oct. 11, 2004) <http://www.alabamaeagle.org/>.
11
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., A Message from the Alabama State Board of Education (visited Sept. 19, 2004)
<http://www.eagleforum.org/educate/1995/dec95/textbook.html>.
10
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theory.12 However, because evolution is referred to as a theory of origins in both evolution
disclaimers and the larger surrounding debate, it will be referred to as such in this paper.
Aside from its scientific problems, this disclaimer which is also included in course
guidelines for science teachers13 has also not yet been challenged on establishment grounds.14
Considering that Alabama is predominantly Christian,15 the disclaimer’s language is relatively
weak, and the residents may be weary of controversy, it is likely this new disclaimer will remain
unchallenged.16
However, while the current Alabama disclaimer seems relatively safe from challenge, an
evolution disclaimer proposed in Oklahoma led to legal disputes.17 As the Oklahoma State
Textbook Committee wanted “textbook publishers to stop presenting evolution as fact and
present other options such as creationism—the theory that God or another higher power created
the universe,”18 it proposed adopting a disclaimer identical to the Alabama disclaimer; however,
the Oklahoma Attorney General rejected the enactment of the disclaimer as beyond the board’s
legitimate powers.19
A proposed disclaimer in Louisiana did not fare much better than the one in Oklahoma
although as with Oklahoma’s version, the Louisiana disclaimer was virtually identical to the
Alabama disclaimer.20 The disclaimer was adopted by Louisiana's Board of Elementary and

12

Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe, Big Bang Cosmology (visited Nov. 1, 2005) <http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/
m_uni/ uni_101bb1.html>.
13
See supra note 7.
14
Jones, supra note 4, at 532.
15
In 1990, 93.30% of Alabama residents were Christian. Adherents.com—Religion by Location, Alabama (visited
Oct. 11, 2004) <http://www.adherents.com/adhloc/Wh_6.html>.
16
See supra note 4, at 533.
17
Id.
18
Diane Plumberg, Disclaimer Sends Message to Publishers, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN 12A (Nov. 11, 1999)
(“A sticker in next year's science textbooks, warning students about evolution, is meant as a message to publishers
that at least a few educators in Oklahoma would like to teach something else.”).
19
Barbara Hoberock and Scott Cooper, Vote To Disclaim Negated: State's AG Says Book Committee Lacks
Authority, TULSA WORLD (Oklahoma) 1 (Feb. 3, 2000).
20
Id.
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Secondary Education, but this same school board rejected it in 2002.21 Along with recognizing
Alabama was the only other state that had adopted such a disclaimer, Louisiana’s decision was
based on its reluctance to fight a battle “it has entered so many times before and lost.”22
Because the Oklahoma and Louisiana disclaimers failed on political grounds, their failure
says little about whether or not they are constitutionally valid.23 However, the constitutionality of
evolution disclaimers remains a relevant issue as is demonstrated by past and current legal
challenges.

B. Case Law

1. Freiler, Selman, and Kitzmiller.
Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education24 is the case that brought the issue of
evolution disclaimers to the forefront. The Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education in Louisiana
sought to disclaim any endorsement of evolution via the following notice:

It is hereby recognized by the . . . Board of Education, that the lesson to be presented,
regarding the origin of life and matter, is known as the Scientific Theory of Evolution and
should be presented to inform students of the scientific concept and not intended to
influence or dissuade the Biblical version of Creation or any other concept. It is further
recognized . . . that it is the basic right and privilege of each student to form his/her own
opinion and maintain beliefs taught by parents on this very important matter of the origin
of life and matter. Students are urged to exercise critical thinking and gather all
information possible and closely examine each alternative toward forming an opinion.25

21

Laura Maggi, Evolution Disclaimer is Struck Down; BESE Refuses to Attach Message to Science Books, TIMESPICAYUNE 4 (Dec. 13, 2002).
22
Id.
23
Jones, supra note 4, at 535.
24
Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999).
25
Id. at 341.
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This disclaimer, which teachers were required to read immediately before teaching evolution,
was the School Board’s response to parental concerns26 that lessons on evolution were troubling
for their children as evolutionary theory contradicted what the children had learned at home and
in church about the origins of life and matter.27 The disclaimer was intended as a non-intrusive
measure to address the needs of a pluralistic student body and protect the rights of children and
parents without altering the school curriculum.28
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck down this
disclaimer as unconstitutional.29 According to the court, not only did the disclaimer’s reference
to the Biblical theory of creation specifically and to the exclusion of any other specific theory of
origins protect and maintain Biblical beliefs about creation, but other aspects of the disclaimer
were also problematic, not because they protected specific religious content but rather because
they protected a religious viewpoint over a non-religiousone. 30
Freiler illustrates the current context of the evolution controversy. School boards
interested in countering the effects of evolution teaching in public schools must adjust their
“strategy of including religious viewpoints in public education by exploring the untested
contours” of previous decisions.31 Any measure that the courts have not yet struck down is still
available as a possible means of countering the teaching of evolution. Freiler suggests one way in
which the Supreme Court might respond to the constitutional question.

26

See M. Drew DeMott, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Board of Education: Disclaiming “The Gospel of Modern Science”,
12 REGENT U. L. REV. 597, 600 (2001).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
185 F.3d at 349.
30
Id. at 346.
31
Jones, supra note 4, at 531.
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One of the more recent cases to consider the constitutionality of an evolution disclaimer
is Selman v. Cobb County School District.32 In Selman, the Georgia school board required that
all new science textbooks bear a sticker reading: “This textbook contains material on evolution.
Evolution is a theory, not a fact, regarding the origin of living thing. This material should be
approached with an open mind, studied carefully, and critically considered.”33 The plaintiffs,
parents of students, argued this disclaimer violated the Establishment Clause by restricting the
teaching of evolution while promoting the teaching of creationism.34 In evaluating the
constitutionality of the sticker, a federal district court held it had the effect of endorsing a
religious viewpoint.35
The most recent case on the constitutionality of evolution disclaimers is Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area School District.36 Although focusing largely on the constitutionality of teaching
intelligent design theory in public schools, the dispute over this theory centered on the disclaimer
teachers were required to read to biology students:
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about Darwin's Theory
of Evolution … Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new
evidence is discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for which there
is no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range
of observations. Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs
from Darwin's view. The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is available for students
who might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent Design actually
involves. With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an open mind. The
school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to individual students and their
families.37
As with the disclaimers in Freiler and Selman, the Kitzmiller disclaimer noted the
weaknesses of evolution and denigrated its credibility by playing on lay notions of “theory.”
32

Selman v. Cobb County School Dist., No. 102-CV-2325-CC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 432 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
Id. at *13.
34
Id. at *70.
35
Id. at *59.
36
No. 04cv2688, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 33647 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
37
Id. at *2.
33
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Despite the explanation of “theory” as being “a well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range
of observations,”38 the use of the term “gaps” emphasized lack of credibility with respect to
evolutionary theory, though no such connotation is attached to the intelligent design theory
subsequently mentioned. Further, the juxtaposition of evolution, information about its potential
gaps, and the mention of intelligent design theory suggested that intelligent design and evolution
were of equal scientific value, with intelligent design perhaps even being more credible as no
“gaps” were mentioned in relation to it.39
Moreover, the description of intelligent design as an “explanation of the origins of life”
and Of Pandas and People as a “reference book” implicitly emphasized the alleged scientific
validity of intelligent design.40 However, the court noted that even a cursory examination of Of
Pandas and People revealed the religious rather than scientific nature of intelligent design
theory.41 Although it did not make an overtly religious reference as did the Freiler disclaimer,
the Kitzmiller disclaimer did make an indirect reference to religion. As such, the court struck
down the disclaimer as favoring religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.42
As in Selman, Kitzmiller deals with evolution disclaimers that are not facially biased
toward religion. The disclaimers at issue in these cases, especially the one in Selman, are
comparable to several other evolution disclaimers, including the one currently used in Alabama
and those that came close to being adopted in Louisiana and Oklahoma. Thus the Selman and
Kitzmiller holdings regarding the unconstitutionality of disclaimers on evolution teaching will
provide guidance for future plaintiffs who want to challenge similar disclaimers in other states.

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at *29 (“The description of the designer in Of Pandas and People…is a ‘master intellect,’ strongly suggesting a
supernatural deity as opposed to any intelligent actor known to exist in the natural world.”).
42
Id. at *174.
39
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2. Daniel and Mozert.
In addition to Freiler and Selman which dealt directly with evolution disclaimers, several
cases have done so indirectly as part of their constitutional analyses of other state-sponsored
religious measures. The first of these, Daniel v. Waters,43 involved a Tennessee statute that
required textbooks dealing with the question of origins to carry disclaimers stating that evolution
(or any other non-Biblical account of creation) was theory, not fact.44 The statute also required
such textbooks to give equal treatment to Biblical and scientific theories of creation.45 The Sixth
Circuit struck down the statute as facially unconstitutional,46 with the court focusing on the
preferential treatment given to “the Biblical version of creation as opposed to any account of the
development of man based on scientific research and reasoning”47 and holding that the statute
impermissibly required teaching to be tailored to religious dogma.
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education48 made a subtle but important point about
problematic elements of evolution disclaimers. The case dealt with reading textbooks on various
subjects rather than specifically with biology texts.49 The parents of some of the school’s
students discovered a number of stories in the texts that they considered contradictory to their
family’s religious beliefs.50 Interestingly, the texts carried an evolution disclaimer stating

43

515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975).
Id.
45
Id. at 487. The statute reads:
Any [biology] textbook . . . used in the public education system which expresses an opinion or relates to a
theory or theories shall give in the same textbook and under the same subject commensurate attention to,
and an equal amount of emphasis on, the origins and creation of man and his world as the same is recorded
in other theories, including, but not limited to, the Genesis account in the Bible.
Id.
46
Id. at 490. The Court noted the “First Amendment does not permit the State to require that teaching and learning
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.” Id.
47
Id.
48
827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
49
Id. at 1060.
50
Id. at 1061.
44

13
“evolution is a theory, not a proven scientific fact.”51 The court stated the plaintiffs gave
inadequate attention to the effect of this disclaimer,52 thereby seemingly suggesting that because
the disclaimer responded to the concerns of religious groups, its inclusion in the texts
undermined the plaintiffs’ argument that the texts were hostile to religious beliefs.53

II. ESTABLISHMENT VERSUS FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE

A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has used various tests to determine whether a government action
violates the Establishment Clause, incoluding: the Lemon test,54 the endorsement test,55 the
coercion test,56 and the neutrality test.57 If the government measure does not meet the particular
test used by the court in any given case, it violates the Establishment Clause.58

51

Id. at 1062.
Id. In describing the testimony of one of the parent-plaintiffs, the opinion states:
Describing evolution as a teaching that there is no God, she identified 24 passages that she considered to
have evolution as a theme. She admitted that the textbooks contained a disclaimer that evolution is a
theory, not a proven scientific fact. Nevertheless, she felt that references to evolution were so pervasive
and presented in such a factual manner as to render the disclaimer meaningless.
(emphasis added).
53
Id.
54
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (stating there are three tests that can be gleaned from Supreme
Court establishment jurisprudence: “[F]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion.”).
55
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (defining “endorsement” as
closely linked to promotion and stating that the endorsement test examines whether the government is promoting
one religion or religious theory over: (1) another religion or religious theory; or (2) irreligion).
56
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (the coercion test holds that "at a minimum . . . government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so’”).
57
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (“If the religious, irreligious, and a religious are all alike eligible for
governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been
done at the behest of the government.”).
58
See Elizabeth A. Harvey, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: Squeeze the Lemon Test out of
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 299, 305 (2001) (listing the various establishment
tests and the elements of each).
52
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The existence of numerous tests has created much confusion in establishment
jurisprudence. Courts do not analyze each case under all establishment tests; rather, the common
practice is to choose the test on the basis of the specific factual scenario of each case.59 Such
case-by- case determination of which test to use is perhaps inevitable considering the lack of
guidance by the Supreme Court on how to conduct the analysis. In recent cases, the Supreme
Court has used the Lemon test alone, “used a modified Lemon test, used Lemon in combination
with another test, and even declined to mention Lemon in its opinion.”60
When additional tests such as the endorsement, coercion, and neutrality tests are added to
the mix, establishment jurisprudence becomes almost impossible to navigate.61 Moreover,
acknowledging the “hopeless disarray”62 of establishment law requires an understanding that
what is usually determinative in the legal analysis is not the greater purpose of the Establishment
Clause63 or the ways in which the various tests reflect its principles; rather, what matters is how
the tests are applied, with one or more tests preferred over others on the facts of a specific case.64

1. The Establishment Tests

59

Andrea A. Mittlieder, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: Ignoring the Flaws in the Establishment
Clause, 46 LOY. L. REV 467, 481 (2000).
60
Id.
61
Mellen, 327 F.3d at 370 (“Because the [Supreme] Court has applied a variety of tests (in various combinations) in
school prayer cases, federal appellate courts have also followed an inconsistent approach.”).
62
Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas concurring) (“[O]ur Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray.”).
63
See Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L.
REV
. 551, 582 (1998) (the Establishment Clause is a “co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious
liberty. The Framers did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone.”). The Establishment
Clause was enacted as the necessary complement of the Free Exercise Clause, with the latter giving citizens
religious freedom and the former restricting state involvement in the propagation of one religion over another, or
religion over irreligion.
64
See Jeffrey Wahl, Comment, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: A Missed Opportunity, 28 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 433, 440-59 (2002) (distinguishing between what the Court should decide and what it most likely will
decide—a distinction that admittedly exists in legal analyses of all subjects but is especially important in the
establishment context). Although the Establishment Clause was not intended to invoke or permit hostility toward
religion, its application according to one or more of the tests may lead to hostility toward religion. Id. at 433.
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(i) The Lemon Test (1971). The Lemon test has three prongs: (1) “secular legislative
purpose”; (2) “primary effect”; and (3) “excessive entanglement.”65 The “secular legislative
purpose” prong of the Lemon test requires the Court look into the “rationale behind the adoption
of the challenged statute.”66 If the actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion, the
statute is unconstitutional.67 However, this prong is violated only if the state-sponsored practice
or statute is wholly motivated by an intent68 to advance religion.69
The “primary effect” prong asks whether regardless of legislative intent, the statute or
state-sponsored action “conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval” of religion.70 For
example, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,71 the Supreme Court held that a Massachusetts zoning
statute that allowed a church to veto the issuance of a liquor license to any establishment located
within a 500-foot radius of the church violated the Establishment Clause.72 According to the
Court, the law had the primary effect of advancing religion because "the churches' power under
the statute [was] standardless” and the “mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative
authority by Church and State provides significant benefit to religion in the minds of some by
reason of the power conferred."73
The third prong of the Lemon test, “excessive entanglement”, asks whether the adoption
of the statute in question would lead to excessive government involvement in monitoring the

65

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Throughout this essay, “intent” and “purpose” will be used interchangeably.
69
See Mittlieder, supra note 59, at 472-73 (“[w]hile the state may present an infinite array of avowed purposes, the
challenged action will survive this test provided that at least one purported purpose” furthers a permissible state
objective).
70
Harvey, supra note 58, at 305.
71
459 U.S. 116 (1982).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 125-26.
66
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activity for possible breaches of constitutional limits.74 For example, in Aguilar v. Felton,75 the
statute at issue provided financial assistance to programs that served the needs of educationally
deprived children from low-income families.76 As part of its plan, the statute used federal funds
to pay the salaries of public employees in parochial schools.77 Thus to make sure that federal
funds were not being used to promote religious beliefs, the government would have actively to
monitor the schools’ curricula and the teachers’ actions. The Supreme Court held that such
constant monitoring would require excessive entanglement of the government with the religious
body.78

(ii) The Endorsement Test (1984).79 Importantly, this last prong was dropped in the
subsequent development of a new establishment test: the endorsement test. As it was articulated
in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,80 the endorsement test is composed
of the “primary effect” and “secular legislative purpose” prongs of the Lemon test.81 The
endorsement test precludes the government from conveying or attempting to convey a message
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. As the test is essentially a

74

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13
473 U.S. 402 (1985).
76
Id. at 404.
77
Id.
78
Id. The Supreme Court has never stated that the Lemon test is binding; in fact, although Lemon has never been
overruled, in recent times the Court has expressed its disagreement with the test. See Linda P. McKenzie, Note, The
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disjunction of two Lemon prongs, any statute that violates either of those prongs also violates the
endorsement test.82

(iii) The Coercion Test (1992). Distinct from the Lemon and endorsement tests is the
coercion test, which was first articulated in Lee v. Weisman83 involving a public school system
that allowed principals to invite clergy to offer invocations and benediction prayers at graduation
ceremonies.84 In striking down the practice on establishment grounds, the Supreme Court held
that including clerical members exerted coercive pressure on those who objected to the inclusion
of religion in public graduation ceremonies.85
The Court defined “coercion” as “an attempt to employ the machinery of the state to
enforce a religious orthodoxy.”86 Coercion can be direct or indirect, with the nature of the
environment in which the government program or action is implemented contributing to the
coercive impact of the measure.87

(iv) The Neutrality Test (2000). The Supreme Court finally developed one other
establishment test, the neutrality test. The Court in Mitchell v. Helms88 used the term "neutrality"
to refer to “generality or evenhandedness of distribution as relevant in judging whether a benefit
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scheme so characterized should be seen as aiding a sectarian school's religious mission.”89
Mitchell mentioned three main criteria by which to “evaluate whether government aid has the
effect of advancing religion: does it result in governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by
reference to religion; or create an excessive entanglement.”90

2. The Underlying Concern of All Establishment Tests
Although the four tests approach the establishment question from different perspectives,
the concern motivating each is whether a given government act has the purpose and/or effect of
favoring or disfavoring religion. Secular legislative purpose and primary effect are two of the
prongs of the Lemon test and the only prongs of the endorsement test. By their very labels, the
coercion and neutrality tests reveal a concern about effect (coerciveness) and purpose
(neutrality). As stated above,91 in Lee, the Court’s definition of “coercion” focused on the
government’s enforcement of a religious orthodoxy. The concern is that such use of government
has a coercive effect on those who do not subscribe to the religion in question or to any religion
at all. With respect to the neutrality test, the Court focuses on the criteria used in deciding who
receives government aid.92 The criteria must not discriminate between religion and non-religion,
or among religions, with this requirement thus ensuring government aid will be motivated by a
neutral purpose.

B. The Free Exercise Clause versus the Establishment Clause
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The larger establishment context demonstrates that above all, the Court is concerned with
preventing government measures that are motivated by an improper discriminatory purpose.
Although framed in terms of “purpose,” the discriminatory rule requires an analysis of effect as
well. In fact, the consideration of effect is perhaps what distinguishes the establishment analysis
from the free exercise analysis.
In the latter, the court looks for a secular legislative purpose in a government action; if
one is found, the inquiry is satisfied and the measure will be considered constitutional. For
example, the court in Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith93 held there would be
no violation of the Free Exercise Clause if a drug rehabilitation organization fired employees
who ingested peyote for sacramental purposes.94 The state law forbidding use of peyote was
generally applicable to religious and non-religious individuals alike and was supported by a
reason unrelated to religious beliefs; thus the lack of discriminatory purpose was sufficient
grounds for upholding the law.95
In contrast, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,96 the Court
struck down city ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice, finding the ordinances were motivated
by animus against the Santeria Church. As such, they were considered “not neutral” nor
generally applicable and therefore in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.97 The Court did not
look to the effect of the statutes; all that mattered was their underlying purpose.
The discriminatory purpose rule was first articulated in Everson v. Board of Education of
Ewing Township,98 in which the Court held that the First Amendment did not prohibit a state
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from using tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils99 as part of a general
program covering the fares of all local students. The Court stated the “‘establishment of religion’
clause of the First Amendment means at least this . . . . Neither [the state nor the federal
government] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another.”100
The rule was again articulated in School District of Abingdon Township, Pennsylvania v.
Schempp,101 in which the Court explained “to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause, there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.”102 Also in Epperson v. Arkansas,103 the Court held the government “may not
be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote
one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite.”104 The
dual concern of the Establishment Clause with both discriminatory purpose and effect was
encapsulated in Lemon’s three-prong test, which was intended to capture the cumulative criteria
developed by the Court in its establishment cases over the course of many years and prevent
“[t]he three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection:
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”105
A comparison of Free Exercise and Establishment cases shows that in establishment
jurisprudence, if a measure is said to have a neutral purpose, that neutrality must be actualized in
its effect. In contrast, free exercise jurisprudence places less importance on effect. Smith shows
that a disparate effect is irrelevant as long as the government measure has a generalized
99
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purpose.106 Similarly, Lukumi suggested that if a law outlawed animal sacrifice on the basis of
neutral criteria, it would be upheld regardless of its effect on Santeria religious practice.107

C. Tension between Free Exercise and Establishment Principles
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are meant to work together to ensure
religion is neither favored nor disfavored; that is, it is not only important that government not
endorse a particular religious measure, but also that it not be hostile to religion. This concern
about anti-religious bias has to do with the “inhibition prong” of the Establishment Clause.108
One of the ideas behind the Religion Clauses was that there was a source of “public good”
outside of—and perhaps higher than—the government or individual.109 The Establishment
Clause embodies this idea by prohibiting the state from inhibiting religion:

The inhibition prong acts then as a free exercise component of the Establishment Clause.
In Justice Brennan's words, the prong prevents the Establishment Clause from being used
“as a sword to justify repression of religion . . . from any aspect of public life."
Presumably, then, the same degree of protection that prevents the state from promoting
religion should apply to prevent it from inhibiting religion, since both are forms of
religious coercion.110
Despite this free exercise element of the Establishment Clause, in practical application,
the negotiation between free exercise and establishment principles at times complicates the
determination of a given government measure’s unconstitutionality. Consider, for example, Elk
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,111 which dealt with the claim the phrase “under God”
in the Pledge of Allegiance was unconstitutional. In this case, Newdow, the father of an
106

494 U.S. at 881.
508 U.S. at 530.
108
Winton E. Yerby III, Comment, Toward Religious Neutrality in the Public School Curriculum, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV
. 899, 919 (1989).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
107

22
elementary school student, challenged the constitutionality of “under God” by arguing it violated
the neutrality principle of the Establishment Clause.112 As the amici curiae briefs in favor of
Newdow pointed out, the phrase can be seen both as discriminating between religion and nonreligion, and among religions. Regarding the former, these briefs contended “[t]o recite the
Pledge is ‘to declare a belief,’ ... to affirm ‘a belief and an attitude of mind.’”113 Not only this,
the phrase “under God” also discriminates between monotheistic and polytheist belief systems;
as one brief pointed out: “The definition of ‘God’ is especially important, particularly in its
singular, capitalized form, a form that is unique to monotheistic religions.”114 It follows from this
position that in requiring students to recite, or even only listen to, the Pledge, the school is
coercing students to partake in a government-sponsored religious practice in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
Yet the religious nature of the phrase “under God” may not be as clearly unlawful as
these proponents made it seem. As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her Newdow concurrence,
the Pledge of Allegiance, even with the “under God” phrase, does not have a discriminatory
effect; the Pledge “acknowledges religion in a general way: a simple reference to a generic ‘God’
.... [it] represents a tolerable attempt to acknowledge religion and to invoke its solemnizing
power without favoring any individual religious sect or belief system.”115 To hold such a
generalized invocation of religion unconstitutional may constitute anti-religion hostility in
violation of the Free Exercise Clause. There is thus a conflict between the free exercise principle
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of preventing anti-religion hostility and the establishment principle of preventing government
support of religious matters.
The solution to the conflict may be found in the differences between the establishment
and free exercise analyses. In the free exercise context, a subjective, discriminatory purpose is
sufficient to invalidate the measure at issue. In the establishment context, the relationship
between purpose and effect suggests that what is important is the objective purpose (defined in
terms of an objectively verifiable neutral effect) rather than the subjective motivations of
disclaimer proponents. As long as the government measure has a neutral primary effect, its
discriminatory purpose is not problematic.
However, the Supreme Court has not always defined the establishment purpose analysis
in this manner, as in some cases, it has chosen to undertake an inquiry into subjective intent. For
example, the Court analyzed balanced treatment statutes—statutes that mandate equal time for
evolution and creationism in public school classrooms—in terms of their legislative history.116 In
a number of other cases the Court looked to the larger history of anti-evolutionism to ascertain
the purpose of a given anti-evolution measure.117 In these cases, the Court focused on the actual,
subjective purpose behind the government measure at issue.
In contrast, the Court has in other cases chosen to look to the objective purpose (that is,
neutral effect) rather than the subjective intent of the legislators. For instance, in a series of cases
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dealing with long-established practices such as Sunday closing laws118 and public Christmas
displays,119 the Court held the initial religious purpose behind these laws is irrelevant in terms of
proving an establishment violation.120 As these practices have become so deeply established in
society, their effect has become secularized, so their primary purpose was deemed secular.121
These two approaches to the secular legislative purpose analysis suggest that although all
three Lemon prongs have to be met, the Court in some establishment cases is focusing on effect
as the primary inquiry, while in other cases purpose is the dispositive prong. One cause of
confusion in establishment jurisprudence is the Court’s labeling of primary effect as an analysis
into objective purpose.
Another way of conceptualizing this problem is by seeing the meaning of “secular
purpose” as plural and non-monolithic.122 Establishment cases demonstrate the definition of
“secular purpose” is fact-dependent and changes according to the nature of the government
measure at issue. Therefore in negotiating between free exercise and establishment principles, to
best protect both establishment and free exercise rights, it appears of paramount importance the
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definition of “secular purpose” change depending on whether a subjective or objective definition
is needed.
One way of determining how the establishment prongs work in any given case is to
compare the government measure at issue with other measures that raise similar free exercise
dilemmas, then group all such similar measures under the same category, with each category
determining how the establishment prongs will be applied (the categorical approach). As such,
the “untainted fruits” category will be proposed as a way to help negotiate the free exerciseestablishment tension implicated in the case of evolution disclaimers.123

III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF EVOLUTION DISCLAIMERS

The tension between establishment and free exercise principles is evident regarding
disclaimers on evolution teaching. As will be demonstrated below,124 evolution disclaimers are
part of a long history of religious opposition to evolution, which in their present form have the
effect of discriminating among religions and between religion and non-religion. This history and
proof of effect raises two important but conflicting considerations: (1) because disclaimers have
the effect of establishing religion and are motivated by a religious purpose, they are likely
constitutionally problematic; and (2) because religious parents have a strong, persistent concern
related to the teaching of evolution in public schools, ignoring this concern altogether may
constitute anti-religious bias.
This Article will first determine the constitutionality of disclaimers as they stand now. The
constitutional analysis will provide insight into why a categorical approach generally and an
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“untainted fruits” category specifically are needed. The current approach to establishment
analysis, where the terms “secular purpose” and “effect” are not defined on a fact-specific basis,
may be inadequately protecting free exercise rights, thus signaling the need for an analytic
method that can respond to the free exercise elements in establishment cases. Further, the
analysis will highlight the problems with disclaimers that will later be addressed in the proposed
generalized disclaimer.

A. Secular Legislative Purpose
As described above,125 “secular legislative purpose” requires essentially an analysis of
intent. The long history of evolution education in public schools reflects the religious purpose
behind disclaimers on evolution teaching and therefore provides the necessary framework for the
secular legislative purpose analysis.
As one commentator has pointed out:

Many religious groups have tried to use public schools as a forum to teach ideas
consistent with their religious beliefs. These efforts have historically taken two forms,
"the public school presentation of religious doctrine for its religious value and the
prohibition of teaching material that conflicts with religious doctrine." Prayer in school
and the posting of the Ten Commandments are examples of public school presentation of
religious doctrine. The removal of objectionable textbooks stand[s] as an obvious
example of creationists' efforts to prohibit teaching material that conflicts with religious
doctrine.126
As will become evident from the history of anti-evolution measures in public schools, evolution
disclaimers are an example of the latter. The “addition of disclaimers to textbooks”127 and/or “the
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reading of disclaimers after a teacher lectures about evolution”128 is a fallback position of the
larger effort to allow creationism an “equal chance in the schools.”129
The history of evolution education in public schools can be categorized in terms of three
methods for giving creationism greater space in public schools.130 The first method, antievolution legislation,131 was exemplified by the Scopes Trial of 1927, which upheld a Tennessee
statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution in the state’s public schools132 despite the statute’s
clear purpose of promoting Biblical creationism.133
The Scopes controversy had long-lasting effects: “Textbooks published throughout the
late 1920s ignored evolutionary biology, and new editions of older volumes deleted the word
evolution and the name Darwin from their indexes. Some even added religious material.”134
These effects were not countered until after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, sparking
concerns about America’s technological progress.135 The Biological Sciences Curriculum Study
(BSCS)136 then discovered that biology education in the U.S. had not been updated for twenty
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years.137 BSCS published several textbooks including discussion of evolution that eventually
came to be accepted by “half the biology textbook market.”138
In response to the efforts of BSCS, anti-evolutionists introduced balanced treatment
statutes.139 These statutes require that if evolution is taught in public schools, then creationism
should (1) also be taught; and (2) be given treatment equal to that given evolution.140 Moreover,
anti-evolutionists dubbed creationism “creation science”141 thus implying that creationism
properly belonged in science classrooms. By 1981, balanced treatment statutes had been
proposed in twenty-five state legislatures.142 However, in Edwards v Aguillard,143 the Supreme
Court struck down such statutes as unconstitutional.144
After the defeat of balanced treatment statutes, evolution disclaimers were introduced
into public school classrooms.145 Viewed within the framework of the creationism-evolution
battle, it is clear the purpose of these disclaimers is to “restrict evolutionists' influence in public
schools by disclaiming that evolution is a fact, thereby leaving the possibility of Biblical creation
open.”146
Parents who support disclaimers usually see them as a part of a larger effort to teach
religious origins theories. For example, the Selman court pointed out that “[e]vidence in the
record suggests that the idea of placing a sticker in the textbooks originated with parents who
137
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opposed the presentation of only evolution in science classrooms and sought to have other
theories, including creation theories, included in the curriculum.”147 The Cobb County, Georgia
Board of Education drafted its evolution disclaimer “in response to a petition effort that gained
support via local Bible study classes.”148 One parent was not satisfied, as she wanted the
disclaimer to “more clearly define alternative explanations” and preferred that it be
supplemented with “an elective science course exploring the controversy.”149 Another parent was
blunter in expressing the religious purpose behind the disclaimer: "We believe the Bible is
correct in that God created man. I don't expect the public school system to teach only
creationism, but I think it should be given its fair share."150
In addition to promoting consideration of religious creation theories, disclaimers are seen
as promoting morality as it is understood by religion. As evolutionary theory is seen as amoral, a
disclaimer that detracts from its credibility is viewed as necessary to the teaching of morality.151
Interestingly, advocates of disclaimers also support the teaching of intelligent design in
science classrooms.152 Intelligent design theory holds that creation has a purpose and is designed
by a higher, “intelligent” Being.153 In many respects, intelligent design is a modified version of
147
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creationism, and its proposed injection into public schools is roughly equivalent to past attempts
to teach creationism alongside evolutionary theory.154 That intelligent design garners support
from the same people who support disclaimers further underscores the fact that disclaimers are
motivated by the desire to advance religious belief in public schools.
Consider, for example, Kitzmiller.155 The defendants in the case were the same school
board members who had previously approved an evolution disclaimer156 and openly admitted
their religious opposition to the teaching of evolution.157 The court’s opinion in Kitzmiller lays
out in detail the religious motivations of the board and describes how the evolution disclaimer
outlining intelligent design theory emerged from a series of board retreats where members
discussed the importance of teaching creationism.158
Although the defendants in cases such as Freiler, Selman, and Kitzmiller presented other
purposes for their disclaimers, the court in each of those cases made clear that all purported

Intelligent design "assumes the work is too complex to be anything but the plan of an intelligent agent."
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differences between intelligent design and creationism, however, intelligent design still differs notably
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purposes must be genuine.159 One alleged purpose was that the disclaimers were meant to quell
the concerns of parents who for religious reasons did not want their children to learn about
evolutionary theory.160 Admittedly, responding to the concerns of religious parents is a
legitimate, secular purpose161 (as it neither hinders nor promotes religious belief), and
constitutionally permissible ways in which this can be done will be discussed below.162 Yet in
the case of anti-evolution measures, the Court has looked for the actual, subjective purpose of the
statute, and in determining whether an alleged purpose is the actual purpose of the statute, the
Court has taken into account the process by which a particular disclaimer was developed.163
Specifically, the Court has used the views expressed in the legislative history of a statute to
define the statute’s legislative purpose.164
For example, the Louisiana disclaimer was the brainchild of the Louisiana Family Forum
(LFF), a Christian fundamentalist organization that has sponsored “Citizens for School Prayer”
rallies165 and touts as an accomplishment its intervention “in Louisiana's science textbook review
and adoption process.”166 Specifically, the LFF has made several presentations “about the many
factual errors contained in proposed textbooks, particularly concerning the theory of macroevolution.”167 The organization’s purpose in proposing the evolution disclaimer is evident from
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See, e.g., Freiler, 185 F.3d at 343 (the “avowed purposes” must be “sincere and not a sham”).
Id. Another alleged purpose was to “encourage informed freedom of belief.” Id. As will be demonstrated, this is
an inherently problematic assertion in the public school context. See discussion infra Part III.
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its mission statement: “[t]o persuasively present biblical principles in the centers of influence on
issues affecting the family through research, communication, and networking.”168
In addition to the history of specific statutes, the history of anti-evolutionism in general
has helped the Supreme Court to determine the purpose of anti-evolution measures. For example,
in Epperson v. Arkansas,169 the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a statute
forbidding the teaching of evolution in public schools, colleges and universities.170 The Court’s
opinion noted the statute “was a product of the upsurge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor of the
twenties. The Arkansas statute was an adaption [sic] of the famous Tennessee 'monkey law'
which that State adopted in 1925.”171 In striking down the statute as unconstitutional, the Court
said:
In the present case, there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers
from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief of some that
the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man. No
suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by considerations of state
policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens.172
Similarly, the Selman court used the long history of anti-evolutionism to support its
conclusion regarding the unconstitutionality of the Cobb disclaimer.173 Regarding the disclaimer,
which read, "evolution is a theory, not a fact, concerning the origin of living things,”174 the court
said:
[T]he first problem with this language is that there has been a lengthy debate between
advocates of evolution and proponents of religious theories of origin specifically
concerning whether evolution should be taught as a fact or as a theory, and the School
168

Louisiana Family Forum, Mission Statement (visited Sept. 19, 2004) <http://www.lafamilyforum.org> (emphasis
added).
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393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
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Id. at 98-99. “The Arkansas law makes it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university ‘to
teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals,’ or ‘to adopt or use
in any such institution a textbook that teaches’ this theory.”
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Id. at 98.
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Id. at 107.
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2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *62.
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Board appears to have sided with the proponents of religious theories of origin in
violation of the Establishment Clause. As the Supreme Court stated in County of
Allegheny v American Civil Liberties Union, “... the Establishment Clause, at the very
least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious
belief," and this is exactly what the School Board appears to have done.175
As this evidence demonstrates, instead of merely responding to the concerns of religious
parents, disclaimers serve religious groups by casting doubt on a theory these groups find
troublesome.176 Therefore the historical evidence satisfies both the subjective and objective
purpose inquiries. On the one hand, the history of anti-evolutionism proves the actual, subjective
intent behind evolution disclaimers is to undermine the credibility of evolutionary theory in order
to strengthen the credibility of creationism. The history also satisfies the objective purpose
inquiry by showing that regardless of subjective intent, the objective purpose behind disclaimers
must be unconstitutional by virtue of the fact that disclaimers continue a long series of antievolution efforts that themselves were deemed unconstitutional.
However, the question is whether the relation between current disclaimers and past antievolution efforts should be enough to invalidate the former. As the discussion of the “primary
effect” prong will demonstrate,177 disclaimers as they stand now are unconstitutional independent
of the history of religious anti-evolution efforts because they single out certain belief systems for
favorable treatment. The compromise between free exercise and establishment principles
mandates that although raising epistemological concerns about scientific theories may be a
legitimate educational objective, for a disclaimer that does this to be constitutionally permissible,
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Id. at 62-63. “Just as citizens around the country have been aware of the historical debate between evolution and
religion, an informed, reasonable observer in this case would be keenly aware of the sequence of events that
preceded the adoption of the Sticker.” Id. at 60. (internal citation omitted).
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it must do so without compromising government neutrality toward religion.178 Arguably then, a
disclaimer that serves religious concerns without discriminating among religions, or between
religion and non-religion, may be constitutional despite its relation to previous religious attempts
at countering the teaching of evolution.

B. Primary Effect
The “primary effect” analysis of evolution disclaimers asks whether such disclaimers
endorse either a particular religious viewpoint or religion in general.179 The emphasis is on bias,
promotion, or favoritism.180 In considering evolution disclaimers under this test, a number of
factors indicate such bias.
First, as evolution is the only academic subject preceded by a disclaimer, the selectivity
of this approach suggests favoritism toward religion.181 As the plaintiffs in Selman noted about
the Cobb disclaimer:

Evolution is the only theory mentioned in the Sticker, and there is no sticker placed in
textbooks related to any other theory, topic, or subject covered in the Cobb County
School District's curriculum … However, there are other scientific topics taught that have
religious implications, such as the theories of gravity, relativity, and Galilean
hehocentrism [sic].182
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See discussion infra Part IV.A.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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See Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 764 (1995) (“‘Endorsement’ connotes an expression or
demonstration of approval or support. Our cases have accordingly equated ‘endorsement’ with ‘promotion’ or
‘favoritism.’”).
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*68.
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Moreover, this selectivity is not viewpoint-neutral, as evolution may be offensive to only certain
religions while being neutral or even favorable to other religious beliefs. For example, as
evolutionary theory may be offensive to Christians but not to Hindus,183 requiring a disclaimer in
association with the teaching of evolution may constitute favoritism among religions.184
Even though other scientific (or, for that matter, historical or literary) ideas may be
offensive to some religions,185 evolution alone is selected for special treatment.186 For example,
the fact the majority of students are Christian rather than Hindu does not affect the
unconstitutionality of the disclaimer.187 Rather, it provides even more reason to prohibit such
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See Hinduism and the Evolution of Life (visited Oct. 4, 2004) <http://www.hinduwebsite.com/evolution.htm>:
Hinduism believes in the concept of evolution of life on earth. Although it is not the same as the one known
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Modern science speaks of physical evolution and the evolution of nervous system, starting with simple life
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biological and mental mechanisms. Man is so far the known and the ultimate product of this very complex
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illumination.
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See supra note 32. Jeffrey Selman, the parent-plaintiff who initiated the lawsuit, “said placing advisories in
science texts is an attempt to inject religion into public schools. ‘Why single out evolution? It has to be coming from
a religious basis, and that violates the separation of church and state.’” Similarly, Michael Manley, attorney for the
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On petition for a rehearing en banc, the dissent in Freiler argued that because “ninety-five percent of the students
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disclaimers as they favor the majority religion (Christianity) over minority religions.188 In
addition, the singling out of evolution alone to be preceded by a disclaimer suggests a preference
of religion over non-religion and of those religious groups wielding greater political power over
those that do not have power.189 Significantly, the Supreme Court made clear in Lynch v
Donnelly190 that because such preference is politically problematic, it is unconstitutional:

The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community. . . . [Governmental
endorsement of religion] sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the
opposite message.191
This favoritism may be subtle. For instance, in Freiler, the disclaimer not only made
specific mention of Biblical theory, but also juxtaposed a disavowal of evolution with
encouragement of students to contemplate alternative origin theories.192 The court held this
combination promoted belief in religious theories at the expense of scientific ones.193 Moreover,
the Court interpreted the disclaimer’s reminder to students that they had the right to maintain the
188

See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.”).
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idea of America as a Christian country. Stephen M. Feldman, Book Review, Principle, History, and Power: The
Limits of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1072 (1996). See also Joseph R.
Duncan, Jr., Commentary, Privilege, Invisibility, and Religion: A Critique of the Privilege that Christianity Has
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465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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beliefs taught to them by their parents as specifically encouraging religious views.194 Taken
together, these aspects of the disclaimer violated the “primary effect” prong of the Lemon test.195
It may be argued that the prohibition of evolution disclaimers does not promote neutrality
among religious viewpoints or between religion and non-religion, because it reflects a dogmatic
approach toward evolution and hostility toward religion.196 Although this concern may be valid,
evolution-specific disclaimers are not the solution. A more appropriate response would be to
create a generalized disclaimer that responds to religious concerns without compromising
government neutrality.197 Permissible objectives can include increasing awareness of the nature
of the scientific enterprise and sources of knowledge; generalized disclaimers that present this
information can help students think critically about science and inquiry—including evolutionary
theory—without singling out evolution for special treatment.

IV. ACCOUNTING FOR FREE EXERCISE ELEMENTS
IN THE DISCLAIMER CASE STUDY

The history of anti-evolutionism and the specific legislative history of various antievolution measures show the objective purpose of evolution disclaimers as they stand now is to
establish religion. Although this Article has concluded that disclaimers on evolution teaching are
constitutionally problematic, it will argue this same history suggests the inquiry should not be
194
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thus limited; that is, the establishment analysis should not preclude scrutiny of the free exercise
elements involved. Because religious parents have strong feelings about the issue of evolution
teaching in public schools, the question becomes whether these feelings can be addressed by
other means, or whether any means at all will be constitutionally invalid simply by virtue of its
being connected to the problematic history of religious anti-evolutionism.

C. Evolution Toward Neutrality: Generalized Disclaimers

As a solution to the free exercise-establishment tension in the current form of disclaimers,
this Part proposes a generalized disclaimer. The aim is to rectify the constitutional flaws with the
form of the disclaimer itself, thus addressing the discriminatory effect of disclaimers, an effort
based on the need to protect the legitimate free exercise principles that are implicated in the case
of disclaimers in general—that is, the desire of religious parents to raise epistemological
concerns about evolutionary theory.
The proposed generalized disclaimer is one that would concede the non-absolute nature
of science and scientific theories without singling out evolutionary theory. The religious parents
who contest the teaching of evolutionary theory sometimes characterize evolution as a dogma of
the “religion of humanism”198, in other words claiming that secularism is a religion in its own
right. Although this characterization of secularism as religion may be flawed in a number of
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Sheila Jasanoff, Biology and the Bill of Rights: Can Science Reframe The Constitution?, 13 AM. J.L. AND
MED. 249, 286-87 (1987):
A perception of this inescapable conflict may explain the recent attacks on the concept of “secular
humanism” by fundamentalist public school students. In early 1987, for example, a federal district judge in
Alabama banned a wide range of public school textbooks on the ground that their failure to pay sufficient
attention to the significance of religion in America and their treatment of morality as a matter of personal
choice impermissibly promoted the religion of secular humanism.
See also Is “Secular Humanism” a “Religion”? (visited Nov. 27, 2005) <http://members.aol.com/Patriarchy/definit
ions/humanism_religion.htm>.
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ways,199 the underlying concern regarding dogmatism can be addressed by a disclaimer that
places science and scientific inquiry in a realist200 framework.
Such a disclaimer may, for instance, describe the uniquely human nature of scientific
discovery and explain how scientists, as humans, are necessarily both constrained by their
physical and mental capacities and shaped by their background beliefs: “The world we humans
inhabit is not brute nature, but nature modified by our physical activities and overlaid by our
semiotic webs, including the imaginative constructions of writers and artists, and the
explanations, descriptions, and theories of detectives, historians, theologians, etc.—and of
scientists.”201 What scientists think is relevant or worth discovering will influence the data they
collect and even the serendipitous discoveries they may stumble upon. For instance, the corpus
of scientific knowledge and the current form of scientific methodology will determine for
scientists which unusual occurrence is important enough to note, or what is “unusual” to begin
with.202
For instance, the disclaimer can relay the story of Galileo or other inventors who
recognized the importance of the discoveries they stumbled upon only because of their training.
For instance, when Galileo turned his telescope on Venus and saw that Venus showed distinct
“phases,” he knew to relate that to the Moon orbiting the Earth, and from thence discovered that
199
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God, Humanity, and the Cosmos, Critical Realism in Science and Religion (visited Nov. 27, 2006)
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Venus orbits the Sun in similar fashion.203 From this fact, Galileo was able to expand out and
hypothesize that because “Venus orbited the Sun [and], small moons orbited Jupiter … it was
more natural to believe that the Earth itself orbited the Sun.”204 Galileo’s previous knowledge
directed him to look out for certain things and to distinguish certain sights as unusual and worthy
of further research and analysis. If the corpus of knowledge and existing scientific controversies
were different, Galileo perhaps would have overlooked the “phases” of Venus, just as he may
well have overlooked other things that were visible through his telescope that today may be
considered scientifically valuable.
Assumptions and epistemological frameworks thus shape and constrain the scientific
enterprise, perhaps in more obvious ways than they do in other knowledge areas. A disclaimer
that encourages students to explore the role background assumptions play in the process of
intellectual inquiry will serve a secular purpose, as is required by the Establishment Clause. To
disentangle how scientists’ knowledge of the physical is necessarily shaped by the tools they use
and the beliefs they hold is to think critically; therefore the laying out of such a philosophical
framework will serve the secular purpose of encouraging critical thinking.
Moreover, science is based on observation of the physical and collection of empirical
data. It is therefore constrained by the limited capacity of the sensory organs with which humans
interact with the world.
Our sensory organs put us in touch with things and events in the world, but our senses are
limited, imperfect, and sometimes distorted by our expectations; and there is no cleanly
identifiable class of purely observational statements, or of observable things. There are
real kinds; but this is only to say that some knots of properties are held together by laws.
There are objective truths, and the sciences sometimes succeed in discovering some of
them; but truth is not transparent, and progress is not guaranteed.205
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A generalized disclaimer that describes such limitations of science is not necessarily
pointing to larger metaphysical truths, but is simply describing perception realistically. To
describe intellectual inquiry in this manner is to prevent a dogmatic approach to science that is
intrinsically hostile to religion.
Previous disclaimers that have been enacted and struck down as unconstitutional provide
some guidance on the linguistics of the generalized disclaimer. For instance, downplaying
scientific theories by manipulating lay connotations of “theory” would lead students to consider
any scientific theory presented in class as unsupported by substantial empirical evidence.
Further, current disclaimers encourage students to “keep an open mind” and think critically, but
the nature of the generalized disclaimer is that it encourages students to think critically without
saying so explicitly. Relaying anecdotes of actual scientists and their process of discovery gives
an accurate picture of the scientific enterprise without suggesting that students should doubt the
information presented in class.
For those parents who are concerned that schools are indoctrinating their children
regarding a false theory, such a generalized disclaimer may respond to their concerns as it opens
up the possibility that evolutionary theory is a product of limited capacities. However, it is
debatable whether a generalized disclaimer would serve religious needs to the satisfaction of
evolution disclaimers’ original proponents because it does not single out evolutionary theory. If
the only disclaimer that serves these proponents’ needs is one limited to evolutionary theory,
then it becomes even more evident that evolution disclaimers have an improper religious
purpose. On the other hand, acceptance of the generalized disclaimer by these proponents does
not compromise its neutrality.206
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D. The Jurisprudential Solution: The “Untainted Fruits of the Poisonous Tree” Approach

1. Variety v. Unity

The tension between the clauses is built into establishment jurisprudence, which can
essentially be condensed down to the establishment tests’ main prongs of “secular purpose” and
“primary effect.” In developing a jurisprudential approach that accounts for legitimate free
exercise elements, the very nature of the establishment tests and the prongs’ definitions are at
issue, with the definitions varying according to the specific facts of the case.
Consider, for example, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet,207 a case in which the Court reaffirmed the prohibition
against singling out a particular religious group for disparate treatment. A plurality of the justices
held that a state statute constituting a village occupied only by Hasidic Jews as a separate public
school district was based on religious favoritism and thus was not neutral between religion and
non-religion or among religions. According to the Court, if the statute had been a generalized
one that gave Kiryas Joel “its authority ... ‘simply as one of many communities eligible for equal
treatment under the law,’" the statute would likely have been constitutional.208 In her
concurrence, O’Connor noted:

constitutional standard. See Kitzmiller, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *49. In its discussion of how the intelligent design
disclaimer has an impermissible effect because it singles out evolutionary theory, the court says, “[t]he evidence in
this case reveals that Defendants do not mandate a similar pronouncement about any other aspect of the biology
curriculum or the curriculum for any other course.” The court’s statement suggests that if other, or all, aspects of the
biology curriculum were addressed by the disclaimer, the disclaimer’s effect may well be constitutionally
permissible.
207
512 U.S. 687 (1994).
208
Stephanie E. Russell, Note, Sorting Through the Establishment Clause Tests, Looking Past the Lemon, 60 MO.
L. REV. 653, 664 (1995):
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Because this benefit was given to this group based on its religion, it seems proper to treat
it as a legislatively drawn religious classification. I realize this is a close question,
because the Satmars may be the only group who currently need this particular
accommodation. The legislature may well be acting without any favoritism, so that if
another group came to ask for a similar district, the group might get it on the same terms
as the Satmars.209
O’Connor goes on to focus on the need for diverse establishment tests, with the
definitions of “effect” and “purpose” dependent on the facts of each case. She insisted that a
“Grand Unified Theory”210 does not address adequately the range of cases that fall under the
Establishment Clause.211 Although the primary aim of establishment analysis is to look for an
improper discriminatory purpose and effect, the manner of the inquiry may vary according to the
nature of the specific case.212
[S]etting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases may sometimes do more harm than
good. Any test that must deal with widely disparate situations risks being so vague as to
be useless . . . Moreover, shoehorning new problems into a test that does not reflect the
special concerns raised by those problems tends to deform the language of the test.213
Some may see O’Connor’s recommendation of a non-unified test as further exacerbating
the confusion surrounding establishment jurisprudence.214 However, as will be seen below, a
focus on facts may actually make the doctrine more comprehensible and predictable.215

For instance, an act written broadly to apply to any group that meets certain criteria would describe the
standards a group would have to meet to receive the benefit of the act. On the other hand, a "series of
special acts" would provide examples of the kinds of organizations that were eligible.
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longer feel the need even to pretend that our haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed by any
principle.’”
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Significantly, O’Connor frames her argument in terms of religious concerns:

Religious needs can be accommodated through laws that are neutral with regard to
religion . . . . What makes accommodation permissible, even praiseworthy, is not that the
government is making life easier for some particular religious group as such. Rather, it is
that the government is accommodating a deeply held belief. Accommodations may thus
justify treating those who share this belief differently from those who do not; but they do
not justify discriminations based on sect.216
O’Connor distinguishes permissible accommodation of religious practices from impermissible
favoritism toward religious groups. Favoritism implies government endorsement of religious
views, either religion over non-religion or among religious viewpoints. On the other hand,
accommodation, on the other hand, does not establish religion but simply serves to protect rather
than hinder or punish the free exercise of religion. As such, cases upholding concessions to
religion are a good place to start in evaluating the way in which establishment analysis turns on
specific facts.
For example, in Lynch the Court upheld the constitutionality of a city's Christmas
display,217 stating that it was justified by a secular purpose—taking “note of a significant
historical religious event long celebrated in the Western World.”218 On its face, a governmentsponsored display directly connected to a religious holiday appears to be the quintessential
establishment violation. Yet the Court was reluctant to disallow a display that served a valid
secular purpose simply because it was related to a particular set of religious beliefs. For the
Court, it was the objective purpose rather than the subjective intent behind the original use of
Christmas displays that was dispositive.
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Similarly, in her concurrence in Lynch, Justice O’Connor pointed out that the direct
religious reference in the “statutorily prescribed national motto ‘In God We Trust’”219 was not
enough to invalidate a government measure; what mattered was the objective purpose of the
measure and its secular effect. In the same concurrence, O’Connor defined the purpose and effect
prongs as not forbidding the “advancement or inhibition of religion”;220 rather, “[w]hat is crucial
is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to
status in the political community.”221 Thus, a permissible accommodation may be distinguished
from an impermissible advancement of religion on the basis of its political significance (or lack
thereof)—that is, whether it reflects government endorsement or disapproval of religion.
In determining whether a given measure constitutes a permissible accommodation or an
establishment of religion, the perspective of the objective, reasonable observer is of central
importance. How the measure is perceived by an objective observer is dependent on its primary
effect; if the measure does not discriminate among religions or convey a religious message, its
purpose—measured according to objective observations rather than subjective intent—will be
secular.222

2. Losing the “Taint”: Generalized Disclaimers as the Hypothetical Untainted
Fruit
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Government measures falling under the “untainted fruits” category are those that present a
unique factual scenario and a correspondingly unique question: whether they are permissible
despite being rooted in a history of legislation motivated by impermissible purposes. That is to
say, despite their being “fruits of the poisonous tree,” can these measures be purged of their
historical taint?
Generalized disclaimers are an example of one such government measure. If enacted,
they will have a neutral, non-discriminatory effect, but if the analysis of their purpose takes into
account the history of anti-evolutionist measures, then generalized disclaimers may well be
constitutionally invalidated on that basis. The fact-based categorical approach is one that allows
for the definition of “secular purpose” to be tailored to the unique free exercise elements of a
given government measure. In the case of measures falling under the untainted fruits approach,
this unique free exercise element is the fact that they are products of a long history that reflects
the genuine religious concerns of a group of citizens. Whereas a non-fact-based approach may
disregard this persistent concern because it is not adequately focused on how free exercise
principles are intertwined with the facts of the case, the categorical approach generally and the
“untainted fruits” category specifically will negotiate adequately between the free exercise and
establishment principles involved.
The differentiating element between government measures falling under the “untainted
fruits” category and those falling under other sorts of categories would be a definition of “secular
purpose” that is more attuned to the unique free exercise elements of measures that are “fruits of
the poisonous tree.” Therefore, the constitutional determination depends on which definition of
“secular purpose” applies to the “untainted fruits” category. Using generalized disclaimers as an
illustration, if the “sham purpose” inquiry applies to generalized disclaimers, then the
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constitutionally problematic history of anti-evolutionism may be enough to invalidate
generalized disclaimers despite their religiously-neutral effect (although, as mentioned above,223
invalidating generalized disclaimers on this basis may breach free exercise rights). If however,
what matters is the objective purpose (or primary effect), then government measures such as
generalized disclaimers that fall within the “untainted fruits” category can be constitutional
despite their relation to a history of unconstitutional measures as long as the modified form has
truly lost the religious taint of its original source (that is, their primary effect has become
neutralized). Such measures may still serve religious concerns, but only incidentally.
Overall, the untainted fruits approach serves to bring the primary effect analysis to the
forefront and to define “secular purpose” in objective rather than subjective terms. Determining
whether generalized disclaimers (and measures like them) should be analyzed for their objective
purpose requires sorting through a number of intricate factual questions. When analyzed
alongside cases of permissible accommodation (that is, cases where the objective purpose
analysis is used), it is apparent that generalized disclaimers are both similar and different in
important ways. For example, the Christmas display in Lynch is a measure that over time has
become so deeply established in society that its primary purpose is no longer religious, but
secular.224 The essential difference between these types of deeply ingrained practices and
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generalized disclaimers is that the former have become purged of their religious roots through
the passage of time. In contrast, the evolution controversy has not lost its religious significance,
and generalized disclaimers, if used, will for a long time be an innovation rather than a timeworn practice.225 It is not the passage of time but the modification in form and substance that sets
generalized disclaimers apart from their constitutionally problematic origins.
On the other hand, deeply ingrained practices and generalized disclaimers are importantly
similar in that they involve community values that overlap with religious values. Like deeply
ingrained practices, generalized disclaimers serve purposes other than responding to the religious
sentiments of certain groups. Encouraging critical thinking and educating students about theories
and sources of knowledge can be a legitimate and beneficial goal of educational institutions
(such as public schools),226 one that is acceptable to evolution’s supporters and detractors and to
religious and non-religious groups alike.
Also important is the fact that public schools, as agents of the state, are limited in the
extent to which they can interfere with a parent’s right to instill religion in his/her children. A
line of parent-state rights cases has held that a “‘custodial parent has a constitutional right to
determine, without undue interference by the state, how best to raise, nurture and educate the
child.’”227 A generalized disclaimer can help protect this constitutional right by limiting the
indoctrination of children in what is often called the religion of “humanism” or anti-religion.228
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Preventing the endorsement of anti-religion and limiting state interference in parental rights are
other values that can be supported by religious and non-religious groups alike. Significantly, if
“secular purpose” is defined to take into account the secular objectives served by generalized
disclaimers, then these disclaimers will be better able to withstand establishment scrutiny.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the criteria for measures being classified under the
“untainted fruits” category and being adjudicated as “untainted” are: (1) these measures are
rooted in an unconstitutional source; (2) the current version of the measure is a fundamentally
modified version of its original version, that is, its primary effect is no longer unconstitutionally
discriminatory; (3) these measures serve one or more secular purposes; (4) despite the fact that
the primary effect of the measure is no longer unconstitutional, these measures are different from
deeply established practices in that their origins are still religiously controversial; and (5) this
religiously controversial original source reflects strong religious interests such that a subjective
definition of “secular purpose” would implicate and likely violate free exercise interests.

3. Losing the “Taint”: Case Law

i.

Grumet.

The untainted fruits approach is a novel suggestion that does not have jurisprudential
precedent. However, the subsequent history of the statute at issue in Grumet is a case study in
how the untainted fruits approach may be employed,229 as the same case that provoked Justice
O’Connor’s suggestion for a fact-based analysis provides an interesting vantage point from
which to analyze how the process of modification may work. Moreover, the subsequent history
of the Grumet statute shows that, without the “untainted fruits” category, courts may remain
229
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uncertain about how to negotiate between establishment and free exercise principles in this
unique type of scenario.230
As mentioned above, the statute in Grumet served to designate as a separate public school
district a village occupied only by Hasidic Jews. The decision to create this separate school
district was based on special educational challenges faced by some of the handicapped Hasidic
children.231 These handicapped children were unable to receive remedial classes in their private
religious schools and were forced to go to public schools for these classes.232 In these public
schools, these children were taunted because of their different language, dress, and religious
practices.233 In order to provide state funding for these children without forcing them to endure
the ridicule they faced in public schools, the state created a separate school district encompassing
only the Hasidic village.234
This statute was challenged, and eventually invalidated, as unconstitutionally establishing
religion because it singled out a religious group for special treatment.235 After the Supreme Court
struck down the statute, the state attempted to pass a broader, more generalized version of the
statute such that in applying for a school district, the eligibility criteria were not religious.236 By
opening up eligibility to a larger number of people, the statute was meant to be generalized
enough to pass establishment scrutiny.
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The first of such attempts at generalization was a statute that required the seceding district
have at least 2,000 children and possess greater wealth than the state average.237 Despite these
seemingly neutral criteria, the statute was challenged and invalidated as unconstitutionally
discriminatory in favor of a particular religious group because in application the only group that
could meet the statutory criteria was the Hasidic Jews involved in the Grumet case.238
Subsequent modifications of the statute continued to broaden the qualifying criteria but were
successively challenged and invalidated until at last the challengers gave up.239 The latest
version—the one that now governs and allows the Hasidic Jews a separate school district—uses
criteria that are broad enough to cover twenty-nine municipalities in New York. As this latest
version has never been legally challenged, no court has ever analyzed its constitutionality.240
The Grumet statute raises an important question about measures falling under the
“untainted fruits” category: at what point is a measure sufficiently generalized so that it no
longer singles out a religious group for special treatment? This inquiry is largely one of “primary
effect” and is a prerequisite to the “untainted fruits” analysis—that is, before an objective
purpose analysis of these measures is conducted, it must first have truly lost its discriminatory
effect (after all, a discriminatory effect is sufficient to invalidate a measure on establishment
grounds). In the case of the several subsequent amendments of the Grumet statute, despite its
increasingly generalized criteria, the statute was time and again deemed inadequately generalized
because of its discriminatory effect. In the case of evolution disclaimers, generalized disclaimers
will likely be considered neutral enough because they remove the primary constitutional flaw of
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current disclaimers—the discrimination among belief systems in favor of religious beliefs that
find evolutionary theory problematic.
Besides raising this question about how generalized a measure has to be in order for it to
lose the “taint” of its source, the subsequent history of the Grumet statute also reveals an
important benefit about the untainted fruits approach. As the post-Grumet statutory history may
be read to suggest, in the absence of the untainted fruits approach, a court may refuse to save a
modified version of an originally unconstitutional measure as long as its history points to an
invalid purpose. Arguably, the successive challenges to the statute were likely centered on, or
motivated by, the fact that the original statute unconstitutionally favored a particular religious
group. Subsequent changes to the statute were never considered sufficient because they kept
allowing the originally favored religious group to be singled out for special treatment. The
statute that currently allows for a special school district for the Hasidic Jew community in New
York has never been challenged, and it therefore remains unknown whether any court would
have looked beyond the history of the statute and instead conducted an objective secular purpose
analysis, as the untainted fruits approach would require if implemented.

ii.

McCreary.

McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky241 provides another
example of a government measure that is rooted in a constitutionally problematic history but is
evolving (or purporting to evolve) toward neutrality. McCreary deals with the latest of a series of
exhibits involving the Ten Commandments. After previous displays of the Commandments in
the county courthouses had been challenged by the ACLU and struck down on establishment
grounds, the counties adopted resolutions calling for exhibits that were broader in scope—that is,
241
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exhibits that demonstrated the Ten Commandments’ effect on the larger American legal
framework.242 In response to these resolutions, the counties revised the exhibits, titling them
"Foundations of American Law and Government" and alleging that the purpose of the exhibits
was to educate citizens about all of the documents displayed, including the Ten
Commandments.243
The key difference between the series of exhibits in McCreary and the modification of
the current form of disclaimer to a generalized one is that the McCreary exhibit did not change in
any fundamental, substantive way from its previous form. The Court emphasized that in order for
the exhibits to be truly secularized rather than simply purporting to be, the Ten Commandments
had to be integrated “into a secular scheme to forestall the broadcast of an otherwise clearly
religious message.”244 Despite the county’s statement that the Ten Commandments were serving
the secular purpose of educating citizens about their country’s legal history, the Court ruled that
such a statement was merely a cover up and that the genuine purpose was religious.245
Interestingly, the Court used the controversial history of previous displays to support its
conclusion, stating that from the perspective of the “reasonable observer,” the history of
litigation surrounding the Ten Commandment display was a key factor in determining the
constitutionality of the current exhibit.246 The role of history in determining the display’s purpose
was the center of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis as well, as an amicus curiae brief in favor of the
petitioners argued:
The Sixth Circuit's use of the "unconstitutional taint" concept presupposes present
unconstitutionality, unless enough time has passed to remove the stigma. In so doing, the
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Sixth Circuit has refused to accept the government's articulated purpose and has treated
the stated purpose with automatic suspicion simply because the actor "has a past."247
The Court’s approach in McCreary may appear to counter the premises of the untainted
fruits approach, but the essential difference between the Court’s analysis in McCreary and the
proposed jurisprudential approach to the generalized disclaimer is the Court’s emphasis on how
despite claims of secularization, the Ten Commandment display remained overtly and obviously
religious.248 In order for a measure to be classified as “untainted,” it must become genuinely
secularized (as determined by the “sham” inquiry). The key factor in determining secularization
is the primary effect of the government measure at issue. The secular purpose and primary effect
analyses intersect and overlap in this regard, with the latter informing the former; when the effect
is neutral, the purpose of a government act—viewed through the eyes of an objective, reasonable
observer—is secular as well.249
Although in some establishment cases the Court has used a subjective definition of
“secular purpose,” in the case of measures that are rooted in a history of unconstitutionality but
have since been modified, an objective analysis is more suited to addressing and protecting the
free exercise elements involved. Otherwise, as noted by the amicus brief quoted above, the very
history of a measure may determine its present constitutional status, despite the fact that on the
whole, the measure is both perceived as secular and serves a secular goal.
In comparing the successive displays in McCreary, the Court noted the vast similarities and
allowed the history of litigation to define the constitutional analysis because no fundamental
247
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change had occurred between the current and former displays.250 In contrast, the generalized
disclaimer seeks to accommodate religious concerns not through artificial modifications to the
disclaimer, but through altering the very facet of disclaimers that make them unconstitutional—
that is, by making disclaimers neutral where they before discriminated among religions and
between religion and non-religion. If the primary effect of a generalized disclaimer is religiously
neutral, its purpose—viewed objectively—would be neutral as well.

iii.

Kitzmiller.

The court in Kitzmiller251 went into extensive detail regarding various aspects of intelligent
design’s problematic history. This analysis dealt largely with the religious roots of intelligent
design theory and then went on to link the teaching of this theory to the larger history of
creationism in public schools.252 The first part of the court’s discussion is not relevant to the
untainted fruits analysis of generalized disclaimers because the generalized disclaimer is in no
way related to intelligent design theory nor any theory about the origins of life. With respect to
generalized disclaimers, no history exists which would mark it as a measure that is inherently
religious. Perhaps the substance of the proposed disclaimer with its focus on the scientific
enterprise as a specifically human endeavor—that is, with human limitations—can somehow be
linked to religion, but such a connection is tenuous at best.
The latter portion of the court’s objective purpose analysis is important to an assessment of
the untainted fruits approach because it emphasizes the neutral primary effect requirement. The
court notes that the reasonable observer, whether he/she is a student or an adult Dover citizen,
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would interpret the insertion of intelligent design theory as part and parcel of the religious
attempt at countering evolution teaching.253 The religious underpinnings of intelligent design
link it to creationism. Further, the specific wording of the intelligent design disclaimer and the
manner in which it is presented underscores this religious connection: “while encouraging
students to keep an open mind and explore alternatives to evolution, [the intelligent design
disclaimer] offers no scientific alternative; instead, the only alternative offered is an inherently
religious one, namely intelligent design.”254
Moreover, the fact that no other topic taught in school was preceded by a disclaimer meant
evolution was distinguished as somehow being worthy of special caution, thus emphasizing the
link to the history of creationism in public schools.255 The disclaimer was accompanied by the
statement “there will be no other discussion of the issue and your teachers will not answer
questions on the issue”—leading the reasonable, objective student to “conclude that [intelligent
design] is a kind of ‘secret science that students apparently can’t discuss with their science
teacher.’”256 Finally, the “opt out” feature, whereby students who do not want to hear the
disclaimer can opt out of being exposed to it, “adds ‘novelty,’ thereby enhancing the importance
of the disclaimer in the students’ eyes.”257 All of these features about the substance and
presentation of the disclaimer led to the primary effect of establishing religion, causing the court,
in speaking from the perspective of the objective observer, to attribute a religious purpose to the
intelligent design disclaimer. As such, the Kitzmiller opinion underscores the fundamental
premise of the untainted fruits approach—a measure can be distinguished as an “untainted fruit”
of its unconstitutional roots only if its primary effect is religiously neutral.
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4. Implications of the Untainted Fruits Approach
The generalized disclaimers analysis proposes that mere history of religious bias is not, or
should not, be enough to invalidate a government measure that is motivated by a legitimate
secular purpose and that has a secular primary effect. The way in which generalized disclaimers
secularize an otherwise religious measure while effectively responding to valid concerns
provides a model for purging the taint of other measures that are designed to reform historically
impermissible statutes for the purposes of responding to legitimate free exercise concerns. The
focus in each such case of modification is changing the primary discriminatory effect of the
original measure into a neutral one. As discussed in the “primary effect” analysis of currently
enacted evolution disclaimers, singling out one religious group or religious groups in general is
constitutionally problematic. Any modified version of a measure must remedy this flaw such that
the overall effect is neutral and adequately generalized.
Significantly, the untainted fruits approach saves these types of measures from being
constitutionally invalidated by responding to and protecting the unique free exercise issues raised
by them. Measures that serve legitimate free exercise concerns are worth salvaging as long as
they serve the larger neutrality principles of the Establishment Clause. Therefore, once a measure
becomes sufficiently generalized, it should not be rejected on the basis of a subjective purpose
analysis. The “untainted fruits” category ensures this much.

CONCLUSION
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is complicated, and at times confusing. Simple labels
such as “secular purpose” and “primary effect” are used to explain a multitude of establishment
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tests, thus collapsing important differences among unique religious issues. Justice O’Connor’s
fact-based approach, implemented in the form of a categorical analysis, suggests a method more
attuned to the complexities of establishment problems and may go a long way toward resolving
jurisprudential confusion in this area.
The value of the fact-based method is demonstrated by the “untainted fruits” category
and its use in analyzing the proposed generalized disclaimers. Because these generalized
disclaimers are rooted in the religiously charged evolution controversy, they raise important
questions about how the “secular purpose” analysis should be conducted in cases that involve
presently generalized, non-discriminatory government measures that emerge from a
constitutionally problematic history. The untainted fruits approach is designed to analyze such
measures in a manner more attuned to their free exercise implications. The determination in all
such cases is whether the fruit of the poisonous tree has in fact lost its taint; thus protecting the
untainted fruit, despite its problematic origins, will ensure a proper balance between free exercise
and establishment interests and facilitate the evolution toward neutrality of similar such
measures.

